

Austrian E-ID 2020 Overview, Discussion

Peter Teufl, peter.teufl@a-sit.at

### SEED TOPICS FOR DISCUSSIONS

Planned E-ID solution for Austria

Compared to current solution

Authentication, Security

Mobile challenges



### CURRENT SOLUTION

#### **De-central solution**

- single service provider or groups of service providers set up their own IDP (MOA)

#### **Authentication**

qualified signature, Chip card or mobile phone signature
 (HandySignatur, remote qualified signature)


#### <u>Attributes</u>

- "minimum dataset": sector specific ID, name, date-of-birth
- stored on the chip-card and/or mobile phone signature (issued and signed by authority)
- mandates

#### <u>Web-only</u>

#### **Registration**

— multiple paths: FinanzOnline, wide range of ROs





### E-ID 2020

#### **Central solution**

- a single IDP will be created to lower SP burden, provide new features
- Plug-ins for legacy systems, which help the SPs within the transition phase

#### **Authentication**

primary focus: mobile-phone-signature and additional mechanisms for mobile scenarios


### **Attributes**

- "minimum dataset": sector specific ID, name, date-of-birth
- plans for additional attributes (address, driving licence ID, etc.)
- issued/signed by authority, during each logon-procedure
- mandates

Web (SAML, OIDC) and mobile (OIDC)

### **Registration**

- passport office, one-time visit (E-ID full)
- simplified upgrade (E-ID light) from existing mobile-phone-signature users (time-limit, then passport office)





# E-ID 2020 - Z00M IN

<u>TSP</u>

for mobile phone signature authentication

**IDP Backend** 

issuing attributes, signing of issued attributes

IDP Frontend


— IDP protocols (SAML, OIDC)

App Register and UI

- Central registry for service providers (self-registration with manual accreditation process)
  - —— SAML/OIDC metadata, friendly names, data protection policies etc.

My E-ID

device management, data protection inquiries, recovery, revocation etc.





### TIMEFRAME

- Pilot operation very soon
  - dual operation of old/new solution
  - gradual shift for service providers
- Complete switch to new system after adequate pilot-time
- Digitale Amt app, will then be upgraded to E-ID app



# E-ID 2020 - AUTHENTICATION

### Mobile phone signature

- 3 factors
  - knowledge (password) verified by server
  - <u>possession</u>: asymmetric key in trust-zone of smartphone
    (Secure Enclave for Apple, different solutions for Android phones)
  - inherence: Fingerprint, Face-ID (depended on the phone, but in general iris scans, 3d-face scans, simple face recognition via photo not accepted), for creating a signature with the key stored in the trust-zone

Continuation, only possible on the same device

- for mobile apps:
  - service provider decides on max time frame
  - mobile phone signature must have been used within this time-frame
    - then, simpler authentication with 2 factors (possession, inherence)



### E-ID 2020 - AUTHENTICATION

### **Continuation**

- Asymmetric key is bound to mobile phone signature creation
- signed record is bound to the asymmetric key and the current device
- Why:
  - in mobile use cases we often require quick subsequent authentication procedures by the user
    - e.g. as seen in banking apps
    - usability and security: entering the mobile phone signature password for every authoric procedure is problematic (usability, and security due to mobile environment)
  - E-ID system provides the means, so that service providers don't need to focus on authentication but are able to rely on the E-ID system



# E-ID 2020 - SECURITY

### General perspective

- detailed risk analysis of all technical/org. processes
- external audits/pen-testing
- overall ISMS for the involved entities
- detailed incident handling procedures

### Technical perspective

- Cryptographic keys within hardware-security-modules
  (SAML, OIDC keys but also temporary keys required during authentication procedures)
- HSM facades for rapidly creating testing, production environments with the appropriate keys and trust-relations
- Cryptographic links between essential operations (e.g. continued authentication linked to mobile phone signature)
- New mobile phone capabilities: key attestation, trust-zones etc.
- Root-detection with standard-means and key attestation



# E-ID 2020 - MOBILE STORIES

### Continuous challenges

- major operating system versions: significant changes
- Android
  - diversity of providers, Google specifications not met
  - Samsung, Huawei devices required specific solutions (documented procedures not working)
  - continuous evolution of features (e.g. face ID on Pixel 4, new APIs which e.g. break dialogs on other phones, e.g. OnePlus)
  - key attestation not correctly implemented by various providers
  - testing on device clouds and many physical devices is essential
- **10**9
  - very small diversity, still significant changes also during non-major updates

